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Abstract 
Does the settling of foreigners cause a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment due to resource 
competition? Or does the interaction allow for more respectful relations? And what if one 
also considers settlement in neighbouring municipalities? Applying an instrumental variable 
approach to variables collected at the municipality level and also including neighbouring 
areas, this paper aims to shed light on these questions by considering the vote for the Lega 
party across Italian municipalities in the 2019 European parliamentary election as a proxy 
for anti-immigration sentiment. Our results point out a negative effect of direct interactions 
with foreigners on the Lega vote, while the proximity of immigrants in neighbouring 
municipalities could have the opposite effect.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2019, the new European Parliament was elected. The election went to the heads of 
far-right leaders across Europe, whose parties were the most voted-for in Austria, France, 
Hungary, Italy, Poland, and the UK. These results have been exalted as clear evidence that 
the respective parties represent the will of an absolute majority. In Italy, the right-wing and 
anti-immigration politician Matteo Salvini—at the time the interior minister and leader of the 
Italian Lega (League), a radical-right party—claimed that Italians had given him a mandate 
to change the EU’s budgetary rules.  
Compared to similar right-wing Western EU parties, the Italian Lega poses a real 
threat to EU progressive forces. In coalition with its traditional allies, the party runs all of 
Italy’s northern regions, experiencing large gains both in left-wing strongholds (e.g., in 
Emilia-Romagna) and in the South. Such a change in its electoral base stems from a new 
political agenda. What characterises the party today is not only a growing hostility towards 
the policies and institutions of the European Union (EU) (Albertazzi et al., 2018; Brunazzo 
and Gilbert, 2017) but also an anti-immigration rhetoric. Mr. Salvini depicts migrants as a 
major driver of social insecurity and as synonymous with delinquency (Brunazzo and Gilbert, 
2017). 
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Such anti-immigration sentiment is not new in the EU. Since the 1990s, anti-
establishment and anti-migrant parties have dramatically increased their electoral success 
throughout the EU (De Vos and Deurloo, 1998; Kessler and Freeman, 2005a), especially 
following the recent economic crisis (Nicoli, 2017). Although there is no consensus on the 
defining features of far-right parties (Fennema, 1997), all of them stress the immigration 
topic (Arregui and Creighton, 2018). Rydgren and Ruth (2013) suggest that the anti-
immigration attitude itself might represent a common driver for the radical right-wing vote. 
In the EU parliament, these positions (i.e., nationalism, Euroscepticism, anti-immigration, 
and right-wing populism) are represented by the ‘Identity and Democracy’ parliament group, 
which Lega also belongs to and which accounts for 9.7% of seats in the 2019 EU Parliament.  
Given this electoral success, it might be worth exploring the main drivers fuelling it. 
Previous studies have stressed the role of both individual-level and geographical drivers (see 
Cushing and Poot, 2004, for an in-depth literature review), while the economic literature has 
pointed out that these parties mostly leverage natives’ fears of migration flows (Arzheimer, 
2009; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002; Norris, 2005; Rydgren, 2008). Although it is not 
possible to test any individual voting mechanisms here due to a lack of individual-level data, 
this article aims to analyse macro-level drivers of right-wing support in Italy, with a specific 
focus on the role played by foreigner settlement. With regard to this latter issue, several 
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hypotheses are proposed. The ‘ethnic competition hypothesis’ or ‘theory of economic 
interest’ (see Olzak, 1992) points out the consequences of direct competition over scarce 
resources between natives and foreigners. Conversely, the ‘contact hypothesis’ (Allport et 
al., 1954) suggests that a direct interaction between foreigners and natives may in fact weaken 
native fear of foreigners. Lastly, the ‘halo effect’ admits territorial spillover effects, 
suggesting that anti-immigration sentiment is highest in areas close to those where a high 
proportion of residents are immigrants, and not really within them (Kestilä and Söderlund, 
2007; Bowyer, 2008; Rydgren and Ruth, 2013).  
The present work aims to contribute to this debate, analysing Lega’s results in the 
2019 European elections with data available at the municipality level. The paper considers 
foreigners as a driver for pro-Lega voting behaviour, with the variables of interest 
instrumented to avoid possible reverse causality. To test both the ethnic competition and 
contact theories, while admitting a possible role of the halo effect, the analysis also considers 
foreigner settlement across neighbouring municipalities (following a methodology similar to 
that adopted by Rydgren and Ruth, 2013, in Sweden). To the best of our knowledge, among 
previous papers studying the various theories on this topic, none have carried out a direct 
comparison of different theories using a spatial analysis method. Certainly, such an 
application to the Italian case is rather new; so far, only a few economic studies have been 
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conducted on this topic in the country (see for instance Barone et al., 2016, and Devillanova, 
2020). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background, discussing the main theories that explain the nexus between migration and 
electoral support for extreme-right parties. Section 3 discusses the data and the adopted 
methodology. Section 4 shows the results, while Section 5 discusses these under the light of 
their policy implications. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. BACKGROUND 
The Lega party: from a regionalist party to a right-wing nationalist one - The electoral 
success of Lega in 2019 can be explained by a dramatic change in its political agenda. 
Since 2013, Lega has actually shifted away from its previous political identity. In the 
1990s, it was a regionalist populist party with a typical ethno-regionalist manifesto 
(Mancosu and Ladini, 2020) and an electorate mostly concentrated in Italy’s northern and 
industrialised regions (Albertazzi et al., 2018; Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017; De Winter and 
Tursan, 2003). Since the success of Beppe Grillo’s party (the Five Star Movement, M5S) in 
2013, the party has progressively turned into a right-wing national party similar to other 
extreme-right parties in the EU, such as the Front National in France (Mancosu and Ladini, 
2020). With the new leadership of Mr. Salvini (which started in 2013), the party’s rhetoric 
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progressively placed greater emphasis on hostility towards EU policies and institutions 
(Albertazzi et al., 2018; Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017; Musella, 2015) as well as towards 
migrants, depicted by Mr. Salvini as the major cause of social insecurity and as 
synonymous with delinquency (Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017). Due to these changes, Lega 
began attracting supporters from across the political spectrum (especially the far-right side) 
and from every Italian region (Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017), not only the northern ones. 
The geography of discontent and the competition over scarce resources: the extreme-
right vote and foreigner settlement - The literature focusing on the link between foreigner 
settlement and the consensus for extreme-right parties is broad. The sociological and 
political literature proposes in-depth theories, mostly implemented through descriptive 
analysis and disregarding causal relationships. Conversely, economic theory often focuses 
on inverse causality issues, neglecting the debate on the different theories. Although in both 
the strands of research there is some consensus on the results, which are rather country-
specific, a common finding is that both individual/social characteristics and 
contextual/geographical variables matter in explaining the willingness to vote for an 
extreme-right party.  
The so-called ‘geographers of discontent’ (see the insightful work of Dijkstra et al., 
2019) address both groups of factors in explaining the anti-establishment vote: these voters 
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are generally older and working class citizens, with low income and low educational 
attainment (Goodwin and Heath, 2016), and they mostly live in the ‘places that do not 
matter’, namely rural and remote areas that are facing de-industrialization, job loss, and a 
declining per-capita income (Dijkstra et al., 2019; Iammarino et al., 2018; Los et al., 2017; 
Martin et al., 2018; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). There, the competition over scarce resources (in 
kind and in cash) has become harsher and harsher, and the ballot box represents a way to 
rebel against both EU integration and migration flows (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018).  
In weak territorial contexts, migrant inflows act as a catalyst to channel natives’ fears, 
which are both economic (Guiso et al., 2017) and linked to a supposed dilution of local or 
national identity (Hobolt, 2016; Rodrik, 2018). For this reason, rural and low population 
density areas are particularly exposed to the rise of the populist vote (Gordon, 2018; Martin 
et al., 2018), with right-wing parties easily capitalizing on natives’ fears of migration flows 
(Arzheimer, 2009; Lubbers et al., 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002; Norris, 2005; 
Rydgren, 2008). There, the xenophobic rhetoric is particularly appealing: migrants and ethnic 
minorities are perceived as undermining prosperity, job opportunities, and the availability of 
public services (Mamonova and Franquesa, 2019). According to this propaganda, immigrants 
(Rydgren, 2003; 2007) i) represent a threat to ethno-national identity; ii) fuel crime, and 
hence, social insecurity; iii) swell the unemployment rate, competing with natives on the 
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local labour market; and iv) abuse the generosity of the EU welfare state, once again in 
competition with the natives, who are made even poorer by the economic crisis. 
In this regard, the ‘ethnic competition hypothesis’ or ‘theory of economic interest’ 
(Olzak, 1992) may explain—on an economic basis—the political success of extreme-right 
political parties. The willingness to vote for these parties is higher the larger is the share of 
foreigners living (and working) in a territory. This is observed by Arzheimer and Carter 
(2006) considering the number of asylum-seekers, by Kessler and Freeman (2005b), who 
find anti-immigrant sentiment to be a good predictor of the intention to vote for extreme-
right parties, and by De Vos and Deurloo (1998), who analyse the 1994 elections in 
Amsterdam at the district level and conclude that the presence of Moroccans and Turks 
increases support for extreme-right parties. Using an IV approach on a panel, roughly similar 
conclusions are obtained by Mendez and Cutillas (2014) for Spain, by Otto and Steinhardt 
(2014) for Germany, and by Halla et al. (2017) for Austria. Considering Italy (namely, the 
2001, 2006, and 2008 Italian national political elections), Barone et al. (2016) also find a 
positive effect of immigration flow on votes for the overall centre-right coalition 
(encompassing also non-extreme right parties). Focusing on the UK elections, Bowyer (2008) 
observes that in the 2002 and 2003 local elections in England the vote for the British National 
Party (BNP) was positively related to immigrant presence at the district level (although ethnic 
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diversity seems to reduce it). Levi et al. (2020) consider the share of votes for the UK 
Independence Party (in 2004–2014) and claim that migrant inflows have a positive effect but 
that it is a short-run effect, vanishing before the parliamentary term. 
As in the case of the ‘geography of discontent’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018), the ethnic 
competition hypothesis is also mostly based on the idea of scarce resources over which 
natives and foreigners compete (Rydgren, 2007; Toshkov and Kortenska, 2015). This 
competition occurs both in the labour market and with regard to welfare, and it is tougher for 
those people who have been facing long-lasting socioeconomic marginalization (Rydgren 
and Ruth, 2013). For instance, in considering labour market competition, Golder (2003) 
compared 165 national elections in 19 countries, finding that immigration has a positive 
effect on populist parties irrespective of the unemployment level but that the unemployment 
rate matters when immigration is high. In addition, Kestilä and Söderlund (2007) conclude 
that socioeconomic conditions, the immigration rate, and the unemployment rate have an 
impact on votes for the Norwegian right-wing Progress Party. Conversely, Otto and 
Steinhardt (2014) claim that welfare state considerations are also important in shaping 
individual attitudes towards immigration, analysing the districts of Hamburg in the period of 
1987 to 1998.  
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Alternative approaches: from contact theory to the halo effect - Despite the large number 
of studies confirming the hypotheses of ethnic competition theory, this approach has been 
questioned. Adopting a natural experiment, Steinmayr (2016) identifies the causal effect of 
arriving refugees in a neighbourhood on support for the far-right Freedom Party of Austria 
(FPOE). Analysing the 2015 national election in Austria, he finds that hosting refugees in the 
community decreases FPOE support. Colantone and Stanig (2018), who address the ‘Leave’ 
option in the Brexit referendum, observe that this is due to the spread of the ‘losers’ of 
economic globalization rather than by immigrant flows. 
Under some circumstances, it seems that foreigner settlement is not the only driver of 
support for extreme-right (and xenophobic) parties. For instance, Lubbers and Scheepers’ 
(2002) region-level analysis of electoral consent for the Front National in France suggests 
that people in regions with few immigrants may perceive the influx of immigrants into France 
in general as much a threat as people living in regions with higher levels of immigrants. 
Similarly, Stockemer (2016) concludes that the real driver of the vote for the extreme-right 
is the perception and not the real number of immigrants. Lastly, Coffé et al. (2007) address 
the electoral success of the Vlaams Blok in Belgium, claiming that the presence of foreigners 
from specific areas (i.e., Turkey and the Maghreb) leads to voting for extreme-right parties. 
According to socioeconomic theory, all of these studies find theoretical justification in the 
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so-called ‘contact hypothesis’: direct interactions between foreigners and the native 
population may in fact weaken natives’ fears of immigrants, stimulating more respectful 
relations (Allport et al., 1954; Husbands, 2002), and hence, lower support for extreme-right 
parties. Some of these studies have applied this theory to the EU context (Brown and Lopez, 
2001; Weldon, 2006). 
However, under a territorial framework, a combination of the two aforementioned 
hypotheses is of interest. The ‘halo effect’ theory suggests that the vote for extreme-right 
parties is still fuelled by anti-immigration sentiment but that this latter is highest in areas that 
are close to ones hosting a large proportion of immigrants, and not really within them 
(Bowyer, 2008; Kestilä and Söderlund, 2007). Two reasons might be behind this hypothesis 
(Rydgren and Ruth, 2013): i) neighbourhoods bordering immigrant-dense areas are often 
lower-middle-class districts (i.e., places typically included into the ‘geography of 
discontent’); ii) people living in immigrant-dense neighbourhoods are still middle-class, but 
they benefit from interactions with immigrants on a friendlier basis, according to the contact 
theory hypothesis of Allport et al. (1954). However, it is worth noting that this effect can be 
appreciated more at the district/neighbourhood level rather that at the municipality (i.e., city) 
level. 
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The territorial framework adopted for the analysis - In this study, the vote for the Lega 
party is analysed adopting a territorial perspective. Dealing with municipality-level data, the 
hypothesis of the geography of discontent approach is first considered. Besides foreigner 
settlement, the vote for extreme-right parties is driven by territorial features such as different 
resource availability across the urban and the rural space. It is not the case that anti-
immigration sentiment occurs in rural and remote areas—where the presence of foreigners is 
actually lower than in urban areas, even as a share of total population—but where the 
competition over scarce resources is harsher.  
In addition to the ethnic competition effect, both contact theory and halo theory 
effects are admitted. In this regard, the presence of foreigners both at the local level (i.e., on 
a municipality basis) and across neighbouring municipalities is included in the analysis, 
according to the traditional spatial econometric approach (Anselin, 1988). Nevertheless, 
contrasting with Rydgren and Ruth (2013) and De Vos and Deurloo (1998), this analysis 
does not refer to district-level data but rather to the more aggregated municipality-level data 
(hence, with different implications for the analysis).  
Firstly, we consider the single-municipality level. At this territorial level, a larger 
presence of foreigners is expected to fuel competition over scarce resources (labour market 
and welfare services): in Italy, the municipality’s local government provides each eligible 
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citizen (both natives and foreigners) with major services such as council houses, 
contributions for accommodation, kindergarten, and income transfers (Saraceno, 2013). 
However, at the same territorial level the contact hypothesis also operates, eventually leading 
to more positive attitudes of natives towards foreigners.  
Secondly, we consider the neighbouring space since both the competition effect and 
the contact theory effect involve wider areas beyond each municipality’s borders. Across the 
set of neighbouring municipalities, competition between natives and foreigners operates in 
the labour market but not with regard to welfare services. Similarly, even when considering 
neighbouring municipalities, contact theory remains valid (albeit weaker) due to several 
reasons: for example, people might attend their upper secondary school or their university 
courses in different (neighbouring) municipalities, while commuting patterns and 
relationship networks cover broader areas. While it may not factor in at the municipality 
level, in the neighbouring space the halo effect may also operate. 
According to the aforementioned effects, different outcomes are observable when 
looking at the single-municipality level or neighbouring areas. At the municipality level, two 
opposite effects are expected to occur: on the one hand, competition over both labour market 
and welfare resources positively affects the vote for Lega (i.e., ethnic competition 
hypothesis); on the other, the effects proposed by contact theory negatively affect it. 
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Conversely, foreigners living in neighbouring municipalities are not in competition with the 
natives over welfare state resources—only over labour market resources. Thus, even when 
considering neighbouring areas, the ethnic competition hypothesis holds. In addition, the halo 
effect is expected to also positively impact the vote for Lega. Conversely, we expect that 
contact theory still operates, although with weaker effects than those observed when 
considering contact within the same municipality. 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
Data - In this work, we consider the vote for Lega in the 2019 EU election as a proxy of anti-
immigrant far-right voting. With more than one third of the total votes, it was the most voted-
for party in Italy1 and the only one belonging to the ‘Identity and Democracy’ EU Parliament 
group. This analysis relies on observational data available at the municipality level and 
retrieved by the Italian Ministry of the Interior. 
To analyse possible drivers explaining this vote, the analysis firstly considers the role 
played by foreigner settlement. To do this, the share of foreigners out of the total population 
at the municipality level (IMM) is considered, as this can influence voting behaviour. 
However, unlike previous studies in this field, the share of foreigners in neighbouring 
municipalities is considered as well. To assess this, the spatial lag of the share of foreigners 
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(IMM_LAG) is considered according to an n x n row-standardized spatial weights matrix 
(W),2 defined according to a queen contiguity matrix.  
As a further focus, this analysis considers some geographical features, and in 
particular the role played by inner areas, i.e., the most remote municipalities across Italy, 
which are located far away from urban centres providing essential services (Barca et al., 
2004). Following the framework of the Italian National Strategy for Inner Areas, the model 
includes a dummy variable (INNER) that distinguishes between inner (i.e., remote) and non-
inner areas. 
Additional covariates control for socioeconomic features that may influence the share 
of votes for Lega. Firstly, population at the municipality level is considered by taking its 
logarithm (Log_pop): indeed, election behaviours differ between urban areas and less-
populated municipalities. Similarly, we consider the share of elderly people (aged 65 and 
over) over the total population (Pop_over_65). Quintiles of per capita income (Income) are 
proxied by taking the average gross taxable income (as provided by the Ministry of Finance). 
With regard to economic characteristics at the municipality level, we also consider the share 
of manufacturing employment in each municipality (Manuf_employment). Additionally, we 
consider two variables referring to the number of volunteers in not-for-profit associations per 
inhabitant (Not‐for‐profit) and the gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education courses 
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(Tertiary_educ). Lastly, given the existence of wide regional differences across Italy, each 
model includes NUTS-2 region fixed effects. For each variable, Table 1 shows the meaning, 
the specification, and the source of each variable included in the models. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Econometric strategy - The relevance of the determinants affecting the vote for Lega are 
first analysed through a simple OLS model implemented in the following way: 
irrr4ir2ir1ir ξγREGβXβIMMβαY 
 
Here, Yir is the share of the vote for Lega in each municipality (i) in region (r), IMMir is the 
share of immigrants on the population resident in the municipality, and Xir is the vector of 
control variables at the municipality level (Log_pop, Pov_over_65, Income, 
Manuf_employment, Manuf_employment squared, Not_for_profit, Tertiary_educ, Inner). 
r and ir are error terms at the NUTS-2 region and municipality level. Due to the historical 
territorial heterogeneity of the consensus for the Lega party, NUTS-2 region fixed effects 
(REG) are controlled for. 
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Conducting the above regression, we analyse only the relation between the presence 
of immigrants and the consensus for Lega. As mentioned in the previous sections, in the 
present paper we adopt a spatial analysis model to distinguish effects deriving from the 
considerable knowledge of a different culture—for which the boundaries are wider than the 
municipal ones—from those deriving from problems related to the scarcity of resources. We 
therefore add to the previous OLS model the variable IMM_LAGi, i.e., the share of foreigners 
on the total population in neighbouring municipalities. 
irrr5ir3ir2ir1ir ξγREGβXβIMM_LAGβIMMβαY 
 
Given the OLS model, it may occur that the error term is not unrelated to the regressors, 
hence making it impossible to attribute a causal interpretation to the coefficients. Here, 
endogeneity may affect the results because, on the one hand, the presence of immigrants may 
influence the preference for far-right parties, but on the other hand, a foreigner choosing 
where to settle may evaluate the anti-immigrant sentiment in that area and avoid 
municipalities where the consensus for far-right parties is high (Kraus and Schwager, 2004). 
When the model includes endogenous regressors, an instrumental variable approach may 
help. 
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At first, we test whether IMM and IMM_LAG are endogenous variables. We conduct 
a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test in which we analyse whether there is a significant difference 
between the OLS and the IV estimator (Davidson, 2000). Our preliminary test strongly rejects 
the hypothesis that IMM and IMM_LAG are exogenous variables3 (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). We overcome the endogeneity of the IMM variable by adopting the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach suggested by Card (2001). In his paper focused on the analysis of 
immigration’s impact on the labour market, Card proposes an instrumental variable based on 
historical settlement patterns. As the previous literature suggests, when a person decides to 
immigrate, he/she prefers to settle in an area with a higher concentration of co-ethnics (see, 
for example, Beine et al., 2011; Filer, 1992; Mayda, 2010). The instrument simply considers, 
for each area of origin (c),4 the historical settlement in municipality (i) weighted for the 







where ΔIMM is the instrumental variable, λit0 is the share of immigrants of origin c in 
municipality i at year t0, and IMMCΔt−t0 is the proportion of inflow immigrants of origin c 
in the country from year t0 to t. 
In regard to the variable IMM_LAGit, we calculate its instrumental variable 
ΔIMM_LAGit as the share of foreigners in neighbouring municipalities, imputed starting with 
ΔIMMit. Adopting this approach, the potential endogeneity is avoided both for the variable 
IMM and for IMM_LAGit, since we consider settlement decisions as not influenced by anti-
immigrant sentiment.5 We set t0at year 2010 for two main reasons. The first is in regards to 
the condition of the Lega party in that year. As already stressed, before the change in the 
party’s leadership in 2013, the name of the party was Lega Nord (literally, ‘Northern 
League’). It was mainly fighting for the independence of the northern regions (disregarding 
the Southern electorate) and the party’s anti-immigration rhetoric was considerably less 
important (Albertazzi et al., 2018; Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017; Mancosu and Ladini, 2020). 
The other (more important) reason that led us to choose that year is that the topic of 
immigration has acquired importance in the public debate and in the agendas of political 
parties since the 2011 ‘immigrants crisis’ (Givens, 2020; Toshkov and Kortenska, 2015), 
when more than 62,000 immigrants arrived in the country, first from the Maghreb then from 
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Libya due to the civil wars that broke out in those areas (Ambrosini, 2020), awakening new 
racism sentiments in the country. 
 
The number of observations - The specification of the number of observations under 
analysis here requires some additional details. The analysis is carried out at the municipality 
level. The use of municipality-level data allows us to not restrict the scope of the analysis, 
i.e., disregarding samples, and to rely on observational data. The drawbacks of this approach 
are also to be mentioned. Implicitly, this analysis assumes the homogeneity of voters within 
each municipality and, hence, does not directly account for individual characteristics. 
Given this framework, we consider the 2019 administrative boundaries, according to 
which the number of municipalities in Italy is 7,960. However, given the latest reorganisation 
of Italian municipalities, which underwent additional merging even during 2019, we have 
excluded 75 municipalities for which there is no information on voting in May 2019. 
Additionally, 14 municipalities have been excluded as it was not possible to compute 
spatially lagged variables for these, since they do not have any neighbouring municipalities 
(islands, for example). Lastly, for the estimated IV models 87 municipalities have been 
dropped from the analysis. Those municipalities had no foreigners at time t0, thus the IV 
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algorithm would return a value equal to 0 even though the share of foreigners has actually 
increased over time.6  
Thus, the OLS models encompass 7,871 observations, while the IV models 
encompass 7,784. For the sake of completeness, the descriptive statistics—shown in the 
following section by variable—cover the total set of observations. 
4. RESULTS  
Descriptive statistics - In the 2019 EU elections, the vote for the Lega party was equal to 
34.26 per cent on a national basis. On a municipality basis, the median value was equal to 
40.22 per cent, despite significant variability across the country. See Table A.1 in Appendix 
A for the descriptive statistics for all variables. 
Figure 1 shows the vote for the Lega party and the share of foreigners, as observed at 
both the municipality level and in neighbouring areas. A strong territorial pattern emerges: 
northern municipalities show a considerably larger share of both votes for Lega and 
foreigners. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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Results of the models - Table 2 shows the results for the estimated models. It presents the 
estimates for the OLS model and for the 2SLS model, both in their basic versions (1 and 3) 
and in the versions including the spatial lag for the share of foreigners (IMM_LAG) (2 and 
4). Disregarding the estimates for the OLS models, which are biased and inconsistent, in (3) 
it is worth noticing that the share of foreigners has a negative effect on the total share of votes 
for Lega at the municipality level. Conversely, the dummy variable INNER shows a positive 
and significant effect. In inner municipalities, this share is 1.86 percentage points greater than 
in non-inner municipalities. Analogously, the coefficient of Log_pop is negative: the more 
populous the municipality, the lower the share of votes for Lega. Other covariates have the 
expected coefficients. Considering a median income (i.e., the third quintile of the 
distribution) as the baseline, poorer municipalities (fourth and fifth quintiles) have a positive 
coefficient while wealthier municipalities (first and second quintiles) show negative 
coefficients. The effect of the share of manufacturing employment on the vote for Lega is 
quadratic. As expected, the number of not-for-profit volunteers per inhabitant is negatively 
associated with the vote for Lega, while contrary to expectations, the gross enrolment ratio 
in tertiary education is not significant. The aforementioned effects are obtained controlling 
for NUTS-2 region effects.  
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As an additional covariate, model (4) includes the spatial lag of foreigners (namely, 
the average share of foreign population living in neighbouring municipalities). In this case, 
other covariates do not change their effects, with the only exceptions of the quadratic share 
of manufacturing employment, which is no longer significant, the share of older population, 
which becomes negatively correlated with Lega consensus, and the fourth quintile of income 
distribution, which is no longer statistically different from the third quintile. However, the 
spatial lagged variable is not significant.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
In Table A.2 in Appendix A, we provide a few robustness checks to verify the stability 
of our results. To enable an easier comparison, in the first two columns we re-present the 
principal analysis shown in Table 2 (models (3) and (4)). In analysis 2, we present the 2SLS 
models applied without considering the share of employment in manufacturing as this 
variable could be affected by endogeneity; in analysis 3, we interact each quintile of income 
with the dummy variable INNER. From an econometric point of view, through these controls 
we are able to understand whether the coefficients resulting from our principal analysis are 
influenced by correlated variables. Analysis 2 does not control for the share of manufacturing 
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employment. This represents an important check insofar as immigrants may decide to 
establish themselves in areas with a higher share of manufacturing or, on the other hand, low-
skilled workers may feel threatened by a greater supply of labour. In analysis 3, we check 
that the correlation between taxable income and the share of the vote for Lega does not 
change in the inner/non-inner areas.7 The results are quite robust to our controls in each 
analysis. Other robustness checks (i.e., on the instrumental variable, the outliers, and the 
covariates) have been conducted as well and are available upon request. 
5. DISCUSSION 
This analysis investigates the main drivers of the vote for the Lega party in Italy, shedding 
new light on the nexus between migration and electoral support.  
Firstly, the use of municipality-level data allows us to refer to observational data, in 
order to control for socioeconomic covariates. In line with the findings from the ‘geography 
of discontent’ literature (Dijkstra et al., 2019; Los et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2018; Rodríguez-
Pose, 2018), the vote for the Lega party is larger the weaker is the socioeconomic fabric—
namely, in less wealthy, rural, and inner municipalities. In particular, Italian inner areas seem 
to be particularly exposed to the rise in the anti-immigration vote. The way inner areas have 
been defined by the National Strategy for Inner Areas (see Barca et al., 2014) is aimed at 
stressing the existing territorial urban–rural imbalances together with their negative 
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consequences (OECD, 2018), and it is easy to see that imbalances mainly have to do with 
overall economic development. Weakening economies as well as depopulation (Barca et al., 
2014) contribute to the process of ongoing socioeconomic marginalisation, which eventually 
fuels the ‘discontent’ process (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Our findings confirm these 
hypotheses, with the municipalities in the inner areas being much more prone to the Lega 
vote, even when jointly controlling for both the share of foreigners living there and specific 
NUTS-2-level region fixed effects. This result may suggest the role of competition over 
scarce resources in favouring the vote for Lega.  
However, this explanation is far from being exhaustive. Both the contact effect and 
the halo effect operate: the former counterbalancing the ethnic competition hypothesis and 
the latter fostering it when also considering neighbouring areas.  
Here, a negative effect played by the share of foreigners at the municipality level on 
the vote for a right-wing party is observed. This suggests that when controlling for other 
covariates, the positive effect of contact between natives and foreigners actually 
counterbalances the effect of competition over scarce resources. This finding—which is quite 
robust among alternative specifications of the model—is in line with those of Coffé et al. 
(2007), Steinmayr (2016), and Stockemer (2016).  
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In particular, Coffé et al. (2007) suggest that it is mainly the fear of foreigners and 
not the real presence of immigrants that drives voting for extreme-right parties. Their results 
also support the abovementioned theory of ‘welfare chauvinism’. Although our findings 
contrast with this theory, we need to conduct further analyses to confirm these initial 
suggestions. Stockemer (2016) found that anti-immigrant parties are no more and no less 
successful at affecting public opinion in areas with a high percentage of foreign-born 
individuals as compared to regions with a low percentage of foreign-born individuals. 
Steinmayr (2016) offers support for the contact hypothesis in Austria, finding that hosting 
refugees decreases FPOE support by 4.42 percentage points.  
With regards to Italy, our results contrast the analyses of Barone et al. (2016) and 
Devillanova (2020). However, this may be explained by a different empirical scheme. In 
comparison with the political parties considered by Barone et al. (2016), this work focuses 
on a political party—Lega —whose main political ideology has increasingly shifted towards 
an anti-immigration position. In his very insightful research, Devillanova (2020) focuses on 
five electoral outcomes in the city area of Milan. He conducts his analysis disaggregating the 
area into neighbourhoods, which have an average size of 2 square kilometres. This is too 
small of a level to distinguish between a direct and indirect effect. Moreover, we opted to 
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consider a single election that has the peculiarity of having been dramatically affected by 
immigration issues(namely, the 2019 EU one).8 
However, the major novelty of this work is the introduction of the spatial lag of 
foreigner presence. This variable addresses the halo effect (Rydgren and Ruth, 2013), but it 
can also be used to verify the contact hypothesis effects that might originate across the 
neighbouring space. Compared with the results observed at the municipality level, the share 
of foreigners across the surrounding municipalities returns a fuzzier picture. The fact that this 
variable does not have any significant effect could suggest that the halo effect and the effect 
of competition over resources in a wider area (e.g., in the case of the labour market, which 
typically involves more neighbouring municipalities) compensate for the effects of contact 
(which are less intense) when considering areas wider than a single municipality. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper contributes to the analysis of factors explaining extreme-right voting in Italy at 
the municipality level. The ethnic competition hypothesis, the contact hypothesis, and the 
halo effect are jointly tested by means of an IV empirical strategy and controlling for 
socioeconomic and territorial covariates (e.g., the presence of inner and remote 
municipalities). As a major novelty, this paper considers the presence of foreigners also 
across neighbouring municipalities. The results strongly point out the role of direct contact 
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with foreigners in reducing the vote for Lega, thus overcoming the effect of competition over 
scarce resources. However, when the focus is widened to neighbouring municipalities this 
effect is weaker. In this latter case, both competition over resources in the labour market and 
a halo effect may play a role.  
More generally, this paper suggests that the settlement of foreigners still affects the 
consensus for anti-immigration parties and that the places that are among the ‘losers’ in this 
economic phase of globalization are particularly prone to voting for extreme-right parties. 
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Table 1 – The regressors included in the analysis 
Name Meaning Specification Source (year) 
Dependent variable 
Lega_vote Votes for the Lega party in the 2019 European 
vote (%) 
% Ministry of the 
Interior (2019) 
Foreigners 
IMM Foreigners out of total population % ISTAT (2018) 
IMM_lag Foreigners out of total population in neighbouring 
municipalities (spatial lag) 
% ISTAT (2018) 
Inner areas 
INNER Dummy variable reflecting inner-area Italian 
municipalities, according to the SNAI 
classification (A-urban poles, B-intermunicipal 
poles, C-belt, D-intermediate, E-peripheral, F-
ultraperipheral). 
dummy: 0 (A, 
B, C municip.); 
1 (D, E, F 
municip.) 
Own elaboration 
on Barca et al. 
(2014) 
Other socioeconomic covariates 
Log_pop Log of total resident population log ISTAT (2018) 
Pop_over_65 Population aged 65 and over on the total % ISTAT (2018) 
Income Average gross taxable income, by quintile ordinal Ministry of 
Economy and 
Finance (2017) 
Manuf_employment Employment in manufacturing in a municipality’ % ISTAT (2016) 
Not-for-profit Number of volunteers in not-for-profit 
organisations per inhabitant 
ratio ISTAT (2011) 
Tertiary_educ Gross enrolment ratio (GER) in tertiary education 
courses: enrolled students as a share of 
population aged 19–23  
ratio ISTAT (2017) 
NUTS-2 regions 
controls (REG) 
Categorical variable of Italian NUTS-2 regions 21 factors - 
Table 2 - Model estimates for the OLS models and the 2SLS models 
 OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 No spatial lags Spatial lags No spatial lags Spatial lags 
Constant 57.676*** 57.068*** 61.745*** 73.032*** 
IMM -0.041 -0.075 -0.672*** -0.559*** 
IMM_lag  0.090  -1.301 
INNER 1.767*** 1.786*** 1.862*** 1.623** 
Log_pop -0.774*** -0.758*** -0.430* -0.460* 
Pop_over_65 -0.107 -0.104 -0.159 -0.235* 
Quintiles of income (base level: third quintile)    
Fifth quintile 1.581** 1.602** 1.943*** 1.823** 
Fourth quintile 1.156** 1.167** 1.026** 0.776 
Second quintile -2.727*** -2.740*** -2.742*** -2.575*** 
First quintile -7.478*** -7.500*** -8.051*** -8.074*** 
Manuf_employment -0.026 -0.027 -0.034 -0.026 
Manuf_employment2 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 
Not-for-profit -9.406* -9.314* -10.803** -12.854** 
Tertiary_educ -0.038 -0.038 -0.045 -0.048 
38 
NUTS-2 region controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,871 7,871 7,784 7, 784 
R-squared 0.713 0.713 0.687 0.603 
Notes: standard errors clustered at the NUTS-2 region level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
APPENDIX A 
Table A.1 - Descriptive statistics 








Foreigners 0.00 3.35 5.96 6.66 9.22 38.20 7960 
Foreigners_spatial_l
ag 




Inner areas type        
Non-inner - - - - - - 3867 







Log_pop 3.37 6.93 7.81 7.84 8.74 14.87 7960 
Pop_over_65 8.15 21.12 24.13 24.70 27.59 66.23 7960 
Income:        
Fifth quintile 6.60 11.91 12.77 12.61 13.51 14.16 1575 
Fourth quintile 14.16 14.89 15.55 15.55 16.23 16.84 1574 
Third quintile 16.84 17.34 17.86 17.86 18.38 18.84 1574 
Second quintile 18.84 19.32 19.83 19.82 20.73 20.83 1574 
First quintile 20.83 21.48 22.31 22.89 23.58 50.59 1574 
Manuf_employment 0.00 9.38 19.73 24.73 37.18 93.71 7949 
Not-for-profit 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.12 2.55 7904 
Tertiary_educ 0.00 38.20 48.13 49.61 59.65 390.91 7959 
Table A.2 – Robustness check regarding the 2SLS models 
 2SLS 2SLS with 
spatial lag 
2SLS 2SLS with 
spatial lag 
2SLS 2SLS with 
spatial lag 
 Base analysis Analysis 2 (no manuf. 
empl.) 
Analysis 3 (interaction 
quintiles–inner areas) 
Constant 61.745*** 73.032*** 63.346*** 76.003*** 61.593*** 72.907*** 
IMM -0.672*** -0.559*** -0.678*** -0.584** -0.664*** -0.548*** 
IMM_lag  -1.301  -1.399  -1.300 
INNER 1.862*** 1.623** 1.846*** 1.579** 1.742** 1.343 
Log_pop -0.430* -0.460* -0.534*** -0.553*** -0.433* -0.463* 
Pop_over_65 -0.159 -0.235* -0.178 -0.267* -0.153 -0.229* 
Quintiles of income (ref. level: third quintile)     
Fifth quintile 1.943*** 1.823** 1.775** 1.657* 2.874*** 2.855** 
Fourth quintile 1.026** 0.776 0.891** 0.603 0.892 0.313 
Second quintile -2.742*** -2.575*** -2.585*** -2.381*** -3.028*** -2.893*** 
First quintile -8.051*** -8.074*** -7.867*** -7.895*** -8.089*** -8.238*** 
Manuf_employment -0.034 -0.026   -0.032 -0.024 
Manuf_employment2 0.001** 0.001   0.001** 0.001 
Not-for-profit -10.803** -12.854** -11.092** -13.426** -10.928** -12.968** 
39 
Tertiary_educ -0.045 -0.048 -0.047 -0.051 -0.045 -0.048 
NUTS-2 region controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interaction inner areas– 
quintiles of income 
No No No No Yes Yes 
       
Observations 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784 
R-squared 0.687 0.603 0.684 0.586 0.688 0.605 
Notes: standard errors clustered at the NUTS-2 region level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
NOTES 
1 Other far-right parties in Italy obtained lower percentages: only Fratelli d’Italia passed the 5% percent 
electoral threshold (with 6.4% of total votes). 







∗  is equal to 1 when 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁(𝑖), 
while it equals 0 when 𝑖 = 𝑗 or when 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and 𝑗   𝑁(𝑖). Here, N(i) just represents the set of neighbours 
of the i-th region. 
3 More details are available upon request. 
4 We aggregate the countries of origin into continents: Africa, America, Asia and Australia, Europe (outside 
of Italy). The instrumental variable distinguishing among areas of origin is an important component since 
it allows a more accurate definition of the historical settlement patterns. 
5 The potential issue of multicollinearity is avoided since the correlation between the two instrumental 
variables is 4.10%. 
6 As a robustness check, we replaced the null values in 2010 with one. The results strongly confirm our 
findings. 
7 The detailed results of the interaction are available upon request. 
                                                 
40 
                                                                                                                                                    
8 https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/feature/what-can-we-expect-from-the-new-european-parliament-on-
migrant-integration 
